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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The  State  concedes  this  case  needs  to  be  remanded.   It  concedes  that  the  district  court
failed to recognize that Mr. Mejia’s initial petition was filed timely under the prison mailbox
rule, and so, the district court actually needs to evaluate the claims raised therein.  The State also
concedes that the district court erred when it dismissed claims discussed in Mr. Mejia’s
supplemental petition because it purported to grant a non-existent motion for summary dismissal,
and thus, failed to give Mr. Mejia the statutorily-required notice and opportunity to respond to
the proposed dismissal.
And yet, despite those concessions, the State still asks this Court to affirm the district court’s
decision to dismiss the supplemental petition.  The State’s request is meritless because the actual
question on appeal is whether Mr. Mejia alleged the possibility of a valid claim, and thus, should
have been appointed counsel.  Therefore, the State is essentially asking this Court to usurp the
district court’s function and, ultimately, become complicit in, rather than remedy, the deprivation
of his statutorily-required opportunity to respond by making determinations about the merits of
his claims without giving him the opportunity to respond and flesh out or supplemental his
claims with the assistance of counsel.
Since the district court’s conceded legal errors taint its decisions on all of Mr. Mejia’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should simply remand this case so that the district
court can actually evaluate the merits of Mr. Mejia’s claims under the proper legal standards
after counsel is appointed to represent him.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Mejia’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Mejia’s post-conviction
petition without providing Mr. Mejia the notice or opportunity to respond required by
I.C. § 19-4906(b).
II. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing several of Mr. Mejia’s claims
for relief based on information from hearings held in the underlying criminal case, as it
had not, nor could it have, taken proper judicial notice of that information.
III. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed several of Mr. Mejia’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as untimely even though his petition was
timely from the judgment of conviction under proper application of the prison mailbox
rule.
IV. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Mejia’s motion for appointment of




The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mejia’s Post-Conviction Petition
Without Providing Mr. Mejia The Notice Or Opportunity To Respond Required By I.C. § 19-
4906(b)
The State concedes that the district court’s decision to summarily dismiss claims
discussed in Mr. Mejia’s June 2016 filing (the supplemental petition) was made in violation of
I.C. § 19-4906 because there was no pending motion for summary disposition and the district
court did not provide notice of the intent to dismiss and an opportunity for Mr. Mejia to respond
thereto.  (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)  Nevertheless, the State argues that this Court should still affirm that
flawed decision by evaluating the merits of those claims itself.  (See Resp. Br., pp.11-19.)  There
are several problems with the State’s argument.
First, that argument represents an improper attempt to artificially separate Mr. Mejia’s
supplemental petition from his initial petition.  As the Legislature has provided:  “[a]ll grounds
for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or
amended application.”  I.C. § 19-4908.  Thus, artificially separating Mr. Mejia’s claims into two
distinct petitions, as the State would do, is improper.
In accordance with that statutory requirement, Mr. Mejia submitted the June filings in an
effort to supplement his timely initial petition filed in November 2015.  (See, e.g., R., p.27
(Mr. Mejia explaining that he was making the June filing “so that the Courts get a better
understanding of [the] legal problem in regards to my post-conviction and treat it as timely
filed.”).  As a result, the claims in the June filing are intrinsically tied to claims in the initial
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November petition.1  Since the State has conceded that the district court erred by not addressing
the initial petition, and so, the initial petition must be remanded, Mr. Mejia’s claims in the
supplemental June filing should go back with the initial petition.2  If they do not go back with the
initial petition, the district court will be forced to evaluate the claims in the initial petition
without all the relevant facts and allegations as such a decision would effectively prevent Mr.
Mejia from supplementing with those relevant facts and allegations on remand.  Therefore,
adopting the State’s approach will only perpetuate the denial of Mr. Mejia’s due process rights
by depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to respond to any notice of summary dismissal that
might arise during the remand.  Therefore,  the State’s attempt to artificially separate the initial
and supplemental petitions and evaluate each in isolation is wholly improper; all the claims
should go back on the concededly-necessary remand.
Second, whether the claims discussed in the supplemental petition should be summarily
dismissed is not even the appropriate question to be asking at this point in the post-conviction
process.  This is because the district court erroneously denied Mr. Mejia’s motion for
1 The only claim in the supplemental petition which was not discussed in the initial petition is
Mr. Mejia’s claim about trial  counsel’s failure to assist  with the I.C.R. 35 motion (hereinafter,
Rule 35 motion).  (See R., pp.4-5; see also R., p.67 (the district court grouping Mr. Mejia’s
claims  in  the  supplemental  petition).)   However,  since  Mr.  Mejia  filed  the  Rule  35  motion
contemporaneously with the initial petition, and he sought to supplement his petition with issues
in regard to the Rule 35 process within a year of the resolution of that motion, the Rule 35 claims
are timely challenged in their own right. See Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 884 (Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining that, to properly raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the Rule 35
context, the petitioner must bring that claim within one year of the time to appeal the order
denying the Rule 35 motion), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Smith v. Idaho,
392 F.3d 350, 357 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004).
2 Due  to  this  relationship  between  the  two  filings,  the  State’s  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of
equitable tolling as it relates to the supplemental petition is wholly irrelevant to this appeal.  (See
Resp. Br., pp.7-9.)  Because the claims were timely raised in the initial November petition, that
makes the discussion or supplementation of those claims in the supplemental June petition timely
as well.   In such circumstances,  the supplemental  petition does not need to be timely from the
judgment of conviction in its own right.
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appointment of counsel.  As a result, even if this Court might believe Mr. Mejia’s claims, in their
present state, do not present a genuine issue of material fact, it still should remand those claims if
they present the possibility of valid claims so that counsel can be appointed to assist Mr. Mejia in
fleshing out or supplementing his claims before the merits are evaluated. See Swader v. State,
143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007) (indicating that the standard for appointment of counsel is lower than
the standard for summary dismissal).
The reason for appointing post-conviction counsel is that an attorney can help the
petitioner allege the necessary facts to adequately support his allegations. Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004).  Thus appointment of counsel is meant to forward Idaho’s long-
standing preference for the district court to rule on the merits of claims, rather than procedurally
default them. See, e.g., Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708 (2005) (citing Garren v. Saccomanno,
86 Idaho 268 (1963)) (reaffirming this preference).  As a result, the question of whether an
attorney should be appointed must be resolved before the merits of claims can be considered.
See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  Therefore, the State’s request for this Court to evaluate
the merits of Mr. Mejia’s claims before counsel is appointed and he is given the opportunity to
flesh out or supplement his pro se petition is improper.  Compare Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731,
737 (2010) (“This Court has held that when the discretion exercised by the district court is
affected by an error of law,[3]  our  role  is  to  note  the  error  made  and  remand  the  case  for
appropriate findings.”).
Counsel should have been appointed in Mr. Mejia’s case since his allegations identify the
possibility of several valid claims.  For example, Mr. Mejia’s claim about not being advised as to
3 While the decision to summarily dismiss a petition is reviewed de novo, Wilson v. State, 133
Idaho 874, 877-78 (Ct. App. 2000), the question of whether or not to appoint counsel is a
decision within the district court’s discretion. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792.
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the potential minimum and maximum punishments prior to entering his plea presents the
possibility of a valid claim – that his attorney was ineffective for not advising him about the
consequences of accepting the plea. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 166-67 (2014)
(explaining that what the district court says at the change of plea hearing does not impact on the
deficient performance analysis, and the evidence in that case showed no prejudice because the
attorney had, in fact, consulted with the defendant on that point after the district court identified
the issue).  That possibility of a valid claim exists regardless of whether the district court
subsequently mentioned that fact during the mechanical plea colloquy.4
Had Mr. Mejia’s trial attorney actually consulted with him about the potential penalties, it
is possible he would have decided not to accept the plea offer and opted instead to try to
negotiate for a deal with a reduction in the charges, and thus, lower potential penalties, or seek
outright acquittal at trial.5  Both those scenarios would show prejudice under Strickland even if
the district court subsequently mentioned the potential penalties in the plea colloquy. See, e.g.,
Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho 234, 239 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010)) (explaining that a petitioner can show prejudice from counsel’s failure to advise him
about the consequences of taking a plea by showing a reasonable possibility that he would have
rejected the plea offer under the circumstances.).6  As such, the facts he alleged identify the
4 Review of this point is, of course, complicated by the problem that the facts in regard to what
happened at the change of plea hearing were not actually properly before the district court in the
first place.  (See Section II, infra; App. Br., pp.11-15.)  As a result, those facts do not form a
valid basis upon which this Court could affirm the district court’s otherwise-erroneous decision.
5 It is important to keep the Idaho Supreme Court’s repeated admonition about pro se petitions in
mind at this point:  a pro se petitioner may not allege facts, not because those facts do not exist,
but simply because he is not aware that he needs to do so in order to make out his claim properly.
See, e.g., Swader, 143 Idaho at 654 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)).  Hence,
the need for appointment of counsel in such cases.  Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93.
6 Should this Court actually consider the audio recording of the change of plea hearing, that
hearing contains information which indicates a potential reasonable basis upon which Mr. Mejia
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possibility of  a  valid  claim  of  ineffective  assistance  of  trial  counsel,  and  thus,  counsel  should
have been appointed in the post-conviction proceedings. Compare Suitts, 141 Idaho at 708
(explaining relief is favored, even in cases where the appellate court is doubtful as to the merits
of the claim because of Idaho’s long-standing preference for the district court to rule on the
merits of claims); cf. Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass’n v. Gneiting, 109 Idaho 493, 495
(1985) (exemplifying application of this rule even though the Court felt that the moving party’s
ability to raise a meritorious defense was “doubtful in the extreme”).7
Similarly, Mr. Mejia’s allegations about trial counsel’s failure to file or assist in the Rule
35 process presents the possibility of a valid claim.  On that point, the State responds that,
because Mr. Mejia’s motion was not timely filed, ipso facto, he could not suffer prejudice from
his attorney’s failure to act to prevent the dismissal of that motion.  (Resp. Br., p.15.)  However,
that argument is actually directly contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Jensen,
126 Idaho 35 (Ct. App. 1994).  In that case, the Court of Appeals held that “where the loss of a
Rule 35 opportunity was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, the late filing of a motion
for Rule 35 relief will be permitted,” because the attorney’s failure to file the motion timely, if
that is proved by the defendant, will “excuse the untimeliness.” Id. at 37.  Therefore, even
may have decided to reject the plea.  As the factual basis for his plea, he explained that, during
an argument, the alleged victim attacked him first, and that, in reacting to that attack, he grabbed
her, threw her against a wall, and struck her.  (See 2/20/15 Audio Recording, ~6:45.)  Thus, he
had a potential self-defense claim on that charge he could have pursued rather than taking the
plea deal (though there were other amendments to the charging information included in the plea
deal).  (See 2/20/15 Audio Recording, ~6:50.)
7 The Gneiting Court “restrict[ed] the precedential value of this opinion to its facts and
circumstances.” Gneiting, 109 Idaho at 494.  As such, it is only provided here as a historical
example of how a learned court has approached a similar situation. See, e.g., Staff of Idaho Real
Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (explaining even “consideration of [an]
unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example, was appropriate”).
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though his Rule 35 motion was not filed timely, his allegations about trial counsel’s failure to act
in the Rule 35 context identifies the possibility of a prejudice under Jensen.
The State’s response on this topic also fails to address the more central part of
Mr. Mejia’s claim in this regard – that counsel was simply ineffective for failing to timely file
the Rule 35 motion. See Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
this  is  a  viable  claim to  raise  in  post-conviction).   Mr.  Mejia’s  attempted  Rule  35  motion  was
accompanied by a letter to the district court which “describe[ed] the reasons why my case should
be looked upon.”  (R., p.58.)  Specifically, that letter provided new and additional information
about the incident which led to his relinquishment, as well as information about other mitigating
factors in his case.  (See R., pp.147-49.)  Thus, there was new and additional information upon
which a timely Rule 35 motion would potentially have been granted.  Therefore, there was the
possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing that motion timely.
See, e.g., Crow v. State, 160 Idaho 201, 208-09 (Ct. App. 2016) (reaffirming that, when a
petitioner alleges ineffective assistance based on the failure to file a motion, the district court is
to consider the potential for success on that motion, as that is usually determinative on both
prongs of Strickland8), rev. denied.
And, in regard to the decision to summarily dismiss the claims as discussed in the
supplemental petition, it is important to note that the letter in support of Mr. Mejia’s Rule 35
motion apparently did not get filed in the post-conviction record with either Mr. Mejia’s initial or
supplemental petitions.9  (See generally R., pp.3-38.)  However, he did attach a copy of that letter
to his attempted response to the order of summary dismissal.  (See R., pp.147-49.)  Therefore, the
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 Given  all  the  issues  Mr.  Mejia  has  experienced  in  this  case  with  getting  his  documents  and
attachments sent to and acknowledged by the district court (see R., pp.23-27), this omission may
have been due to factors beyond his control.
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record on appeal actually demonstrates that there is information with which Mr. Mejia could
have supplemented his petition so as to present the possibility of a valid claim, and thus, prevent
the summary dismissal of his petition, had the district court actually given him the appropriate
notice and opportunity to respond.  As such, this claim from the supplemental petition needs to
go back on remand for the district court to actually consider the merits of Mr. Mejia’s allegations
rather than, as the State would have it, this Court making factual determinations and weighing
the  resulting  facts  in  that  claim  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.10 See, e.g., Quick v. Crane, 111
Idaho 759, 772 (1986) (“We have long held that the appellate court should not substitute its
discretion for that of the trial court.”).
Similarly, in his attempt to respond to the summary dismissal, Mr. Mejia alleged that his
answers on the guilty plea questionnaire were not reliable because his trial attorney “had me rush
through my guilty plea advisory form” on the day of the change of plea hearing.  (See R., pp.96,
116.)  That allegation of fact would directly address one of the points on which the district court
based its decision to dismiss his petition – that the answers on that questionnaire disproved his
post-conviction claims. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (reminding the courts that, when
considering summary dismissal, the inferences must be “liberally construed in favor of the
petitioner,” meaning, the court must ask: if the petitioner’s alleged version of the facts were
true, would he be entitled to relief?).  This, then, further demonstrates that there were facts which
Mr. Mejia could have alleged to flesh out his other claims had the district court not erroneously
deprived  him  of  the  opportunity  to  do  so.   Thus,  summary  dismissal  of  these  claims  without
10 And ultimately, even if this Court determines that some of Mr. Mejia’s allegations in the
supplemental petition were properly dismissed without appointing counsel, that does not mean
that all his allegations in the supplemental petition failed to meet that standard.  Those other
claims still need to go back on remand because they were, as the State conceded, dismissed in
violation of I.C. § 19-4906(b).
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appointing counsel or providing the statutorily-required opportunity to respond is reversible
error.
For all these reasons, this Court should remand the entire case in light of the district
court’s conceded errors rather than engage in the unnecessary and problematic task of trying to
determine which claims should be considered on remand.  The district court’s decisions in regard
to all his claims were tainted, and so, all those decisions should be vacated.
II.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Several Of Mr. Mejia’s Claims For Relief
Based On Information From Hearings Held In The Underlying Criminal Case, As It Had Not,
Nor Could It Have, Taken Proper Judicial Notice Of That Information
The State has conceded that the district court erred by relying on the information from the
hearings in the underlying criminal case because it had not, nor could it have, taken proper
judicial notice of that information.  (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  However, it argues that error was
harmless because that was merely a procedural error and “this Court can review the audio
recordings  and  reach  the  same  conclusions  as  the  district  court.”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.13.)   That
argument fails because this error affected Mr. Mejia’s substantial rights. See I.R.C.P. 61 (“the
court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”).
Specifically,  the  district  court’s  error  introduced  information  of  which  Mr.  Mejia  never
had notice into the post-conviction case, and it was upon that information that the district court
summarily dismissed his petition without him ever having an opportunity to respond to or
otherwise address that information.  “The opportunity for an applicant to adequately and
appropriately respond to the district court’s notice, in order to avoid summary dismissal and have
the merits of his or her application considered at an evidentiary hearing, is a substantial right.”
Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 865 (Ct. App. 1999) (making this point specifically in an
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analysis under I.R.C.P. 61).  The deprivation of this right cannot be disregarded. Id.  Since the
district court’s erroneous admission and consideration of that information affected Mr. Mejia’s
substantial due process rights, that error was not harmless.
III.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Several Of Mr. Mejia’s Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel As Untimely Even Though His Petition Was Timely From
The Judgment Of Conviction Under Proper Application Of The Prison Mailbox Rule
The State has conceded that the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Mejia’s initial
petition because it was timely filed in November 2015 under the prison mailbox rule.  (Resp.
Br., pp.10-11.)  As such, it conceded that this case must be remanded so that the district court
can actually consider the claims raised therein.  (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)  Since most of the claims
discussed in supplemental June petition relate to the claims raised in that initial petition, the
entire case should be remanded for proper consideration by the district court.
IV.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mejia’s Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
Because He Alleged The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
As discussed in detail in Section I, supra, Mr. Mejia’s filings presented the possibility of
several valid claims.  Thus, the State’s argument that this Court should affirm the summary
dismissal of any of those claims without appointing counsel first is baseless. See, e.g.,
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93.  This is particularly true in regard to the claims which the
district court refused to consider based on its erroneous conclusion that they were not timely
raised. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 772 (“We have long held that the appellate court should not
substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.”).  Rather, it should remand the case so that the
district court can properly consider the merits of Mr. Mejia’s claims after he has the opportunity
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to present any additional, relevant facts with the assistance of counsel. See Eby, 148 Idaho at
737.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mejia respectfully requests this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings after he is
appointed an attorney.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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